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On January 29, 2001, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) implemented decimalization. Beginning on
that Monday, stocks began to be priced in dollars and
cents, and price changes were allowed to be as small
as 1 cent.1 Prior to this change, NYSE stocks were
quoted in fractions of a dollar and traded in increments
of 1/16, or 6.25 cents. Decimalization of stock markets
is relevant for policymakers because it has the poten-
tial to affect market liquidity, and therefore the over-
all functioning of financial markets.
Advocates of the adoption of decimalization argue
that the finer gradation of stock prices will benefit in-
vestors. This is because the pricing increment dictates
the smallest possible bid–ask spread for a given stock.
This spread represents the difference between the lowest
price an investor can pay for a stock and the highest
price an investor can receive for selling the same stock.
Prior to decimalization, actively traded stocks often
had a spread equal to the minimum price increment, or
tick, of 6.25 cents. For instance, an investor might have
faced a bid–ask spread of 50 1/2–50 9/16 for shares
of stock in XYZ company on Friday, January 26, 2001.
That is, abstracting from any transaction fees levied
by brokers, an investor wanting to sell a round lot of
100 shares of XYZ could expect to receive $5,050 and
an investor needing to buy 100 shares would have to
pay $5,056.25. Following decimalization, however,
the two investors might face a spread of 50.51–50.53.
Thus, the seller of XYZ would receive an extra penny
per share and the buyer of XYZ shares would save
3.25 cents per share.
However, decimalization may affect more than a
stock’s bid–ask spread. To understand this, consider the
set of firms and individuals that stand ready to buy and
sell the stock of XYZ company. For example, prior to
decimalization, a dealer might have been willing to
commit to buy 10,000 shares of XYZ company at 50 1/2
and to sell 10,000 shares at 50 9/16. In practice, these
commitments may have been made by the dealer
placing a limit buy order for 10,000 at 50 1/2 and a
limit sell order for 10,000 shares at 50 9/16. If these are
the only outstanding orders for XYZ stock at these
prices, then the stock will have a bid–ask spread of
1/16 and a so-called depth of 10,000 (at the bid price)
by 10,000 (at the ask price) shares. With decimal pricing,
the same dealer may have decided not to post limit
orders of the same size at the new prices of 50.51–50.53.
This is because the profitability of committing to be
willing to both buy and sell a given stock, as measured
by the bid–ask spread, has declined. Thus, the dealer
might only be willing to offer depth of 1,000 by 1,000.
From the perspective of a small investor, for example
one wishing to trade only a few hundred shares, this
reduction in depth at the bid–ask spread is not a con-
cern. Depth at the best available prices will suffice.
However, for large traders, for example those wishing
to trade several thousand shares, quoted depth at the
best-quoted prices may be insufficient to fill the de-
sired order. For such trades, the effective transaction
price lies somewhere outside the posted bid and ask.
In this article, I examine how various measures
of stock market liquidity changed following decimal-
ization. A stock’s illiquidity measures the cost to a buyer
or seller of transacting in shares beyond the true un-
derlying value of the security. These costs arise from
a lack of an infinite supply of shares that can be pur-
chased and sold at the same price. That is, if investors
could buy or sell any number of shares of XYZ stock
at 50.52, then one would say that XYZ shares are per-
fectly liquid at that price. Bid–ask spreads and limited
depth represent two departures from this situation and,
thus, bid–ask spreads and depth are two measures of3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
liquidity. Lower spreads and higher depth represent
more liquidity. Higher spreads and lower depth signal
less liquidity.
I document that decimalization did lead to smaller
spreads and lower depth, and thus caused a theoretically
ambiguous change to market liquidity. Thus, to em-
pirically address whether and/or to what extent market
liquidity was affected by decimalization, one must focus
on a liquidity measure that is affected by both a finer
pricing grid and lower depth. In this article, I examine
the revision to a stock’s price that follows a trade as a
direct measure of a stock’s liquidity. This is known as
the price impact of a trade. By definition, perfect liquid-
ity implies that a given trade should not affect the price.2
With imperfect liquidity, the size of the price revision
following a trade is likely positively related to tick
size, since any adjustment to prices must be at least
as large as the minimum tick. Likewise, the price im-
pact should be negatively related to market depth, since
lower depth implies that a given (large) trade may
have to travel through more prices in order to be filled.
In this study, I examine the stocks of 1,339 com-
panies that began decimal trading on the NYSE on
January 29, 2001. I document what previous studies
have found regarding the relationship between tick
size, bid–ask spreads, and depth. I then estimate the
price impact of a trade, distinguishing trades under-
taken before decimalization from those after and fur-
ther distinguishing large trades from small trades. I find
that for both large and small trades, decimalization
typically led to an improvement in liquidity as mea-
sured by a decline in the price impact of a trade for
actively traded stocks. For less actively traded stocks,
decimalization led to improved liquidity more often
than it led to reduced liquidity. However, the most com-
mon empirical finding for infrequently traded stocks
was that there was not a statistically significant change
in liquidity following decimalization.
Selective literature review
I mention only a few contributions to the extensive
literature on the effects of reducing tick sizes on vari-
ous measures of market performance, including liquidity.
In Seppi’s (1997) theoretical framework, reduction in
tick sizes leads to a reduction in the willingness of both
small and large traders to supply liquidity through limit
orders (depth). However, because retail investors re-
quire less depth to conduct trading, optimal tick size
depends positively on typical trade size. That is, institu-
tions that typically trade in large amounts prefer large
tick sizes, whereas small investors prefer small tick sizes.
Harris (1994), using data from a time when the min-
imum tick was 1/8, fits a regression model estimating
the frequency at which spreads are at the minimum.
Using this relationship, Harris estimates that the im-
pact of reducing the minimum tick size to 1/16 would
be accompanied by both lower bid–ask spreads and
lower quoted depth. His results are therefore also con-
sistent with the notion that optimal tick size is related
to the size of a trade. They indicate that small traders
would almost certainly benefit from smaller tick sizes,
but that large traders might be hurt if the depth of the
market were to fall sufficiently.
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) analyze the NYSE’s
reduction in tick size from 1/8 to 1/16 and address the
relationship between minimum tick size, bid–ask
spreads, and market liquidity. What is unique about this
study is that these authors not only look at the depth
reported at the best bid and ask prices, they also collect
data on liquidity available at some distance away from
the best bid and ask prices. This complete collection
of prices and available depth is called the limit order
book. They find that not only did depth at the best bid
and ask decline, but cumulative depth similarly de-
clined throughout the limit order book following the
NYSE’s previous reduction in minimum tick size. They
found such declines in depth as far as 50 cents from
the midpoint of the bid–ask spread. Using implied aver-
age price of a trade of a given size derived from the
limit order book, these authors find that large traders
were not made better off by the smaller tick sizes and
were made worse off for infrequently traded stocks.
More recent work has examined changes in mar-
ket liquidity for NYSE-listed stocks since decimaliza-
tion. Chakravarty et al. (2001) study a small set of
stocks that began trading in decimals as part of an
NYSE pilot program in 2000. These authors find that
decimalization has led to significantly lower spreads
and also lower quoted depth. Bacidore et al. (2001)
also study stocks in the decimalization pilot. These
authors focus on whether decimalization leads to sig-
nificant changes in order submission strategies. They
find that there is no noticeable change in the use of
limit versus market orders, but the size of limit orders
has fallen and the frequency of limit order cancellation
has increased since decimalization. Smaller limit orders
and higher cancellation rates explain how lower depth
materialized.
Bessembinder (2003) studies a larger sample of
NYSE and Nasdaq (National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation) stocks and documents
that following decimalization, bid–ask spreads fell
noticeably, with the largest declines seen for the most
actively traded stocks. Bessembinder also reports an
increase in the frequency of price improvement on the
NYSE following decimalization. Price improvement4 4Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
occurs when a trade is conducted at a price
inside the bid–ask spread. Higher rates of
price improvement are consistent with the
fact that decimalization makes it easier for
traders to step in front of the current best
bid or ask to take the other side of a mar-
ket order.
Data, sample selection, and
summary statistics
For this study, I extracted stock mar-
ket trade and quote data from the NYSE
TAQ (Trades and Quotes) database, cover-
ing the 24 trading days beginning Tuesday,
January 16, 2001, and ending on February 16,
2001.3 Following Hasbrouck (1991), I also impose a
minimum price requirement on each company’s stock.
I require each stock to be trading for at least $5, on
average, during the five-week sample period. I simi-
larly impose a maximum price of $200. Also follow-
ing Hasbrouck (1991), I require a minimum level of
trading activity. I limit my sample to stocks that trad-
ed, on average, at least every ten minutes over these
five weeks. Finally, I eliminate those stocks that were
part of the NYSE pilot program and, therefore, trad-
ed in decimals prior to January 29, 2001. My final
sample consists of 1,339 stocks.
The data are then adjusted according to procedures
common in the microstructure literature. Following
Hasbrouck (1991), I keep only New York quotes and
consider multiple trades on a regional exchange for the
same stock at the same price and time to be one trade.
Then, I sort the trade data (for each company and day)
by time, with the prevailing quote at transaction t de-
fined to be the last quote that was posted at least five
seconds before the transaction (Lee and Ready, 1991).
I group the 1,339 stocks into six categories accord-
ing to their average trade frequency, with Category 1
stocks being the least traded and Category 6 stocks
being the most frequently traded. The number of stocks
in each category is shown in table 1. I first calculate
the narrowest bid–ask spread witnessed by each stock
and for each day. I then average these minimums across
stocks within the same trading category. These average
minimum values are plotted in figure 1. As is apparent
from figure 1, minimum tick size strongly influences
the extent to which bid–ask spreads can narrow with-
in a day. Every stock in the four most actively traded
categories experienced a bid–ask spread equal to the
minimum tick size at least once on every day of the
sample period. For stocks in Category 2, that is, those
trading every one to five minutes, minimum spreads
were always within 1/10 of a cent of the minimum tick
size, suggesting that nearly all of the 722 stocks in that
category experience minimum tick-sized spreads dur-
ing each day. Even for those stocks trading only every
five to ten minutes, average minimum spreads hover
around 6.5 cents when the minimum tick size was
6.25 and fall to around 2 cents after decimalization.
Figure 2 plots the mean spread within a day aver-
aged across stocks in a given trading category. As ex-
pected, more frequently traded stocks have lower
spreads. For stocks in all categories, decimalization
has led to a decline in average bid–ask spreads. This
decline in mean spreads is most pronounced for the
more actively traded stocks. For example, mean bid–
ask spreads for stocks in Category 1 averaged 13.6
cents, about a penny over two ticks, in the two weeks
prior to decimalization. Following decimalization, the
average mean spread of these stocks fell to 10.5 cents.
For the most actively traded stocks, average mean
spreads were 11.3 cents before decimalization and
fell to 7.0 cents after.
The narrowing of bid–ask spreads following deci-
malization illustrated in figures 1 and 2 has been ac-
companied by a decline in average depth at the posted
prices. Figure 3 reports the mean of the bid and ask
depth posted throughout a day, averaged across stocks
in each category. The post-decimalization decline in
posted depth was significant, especially for the most
actively traded stocks that had previously had a very
large number of shares committed to trade at the post-
ed spread. For the least actively traded stocks, posted
depth fell by half, from just under 6,600 shares to 3,300
shares on average. The most actively traded stocks
experienced depth declines of more than two-thirds,
from an average of 18,700 shares to slightly more
than 6,000 shares.
Price impact of trading
The statistics reported in the previous section
confirm that decimalization has led to both a decline
TABLE 1
Average trading activity of sample stocks
Number
Category Average time between trades of stocks
1 5–10 minutes 191
2 1 minute–4 minutes, 59 seconds 722
3 30–59 seconds 237
4 15–29 seconds 108
5 5–14 seconds 70
6 Less than 5 seconds 11
Source: New York Stock Exchange, 2001, Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database,
January 16–February 16.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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in spreads and a decline in depth. Thus, an investor
making a relatively small trade generally faces improved
liquidity, since the trade can be executed at a narrower
spread. For institutional investors making large trades,
however, the lower depth may imply that a large trade
must travel through several prices before being ful-
filled, and thus decimalization may not necessarily have
led to better execution prices. To try to combine the
effects of spread and depth in one framework, I examine
a liquidity measure called the price impact of a trade,
which was first motivated and estimated by Hasbrouck
(1991). This is a measure of how much the price of a
stock changes following a given trade as estimated in
an autoregression framework. While other measures of
liquidity are conceivable, price impact has the advantage
of being influenced by both smaller price increments
and lower depth. In particular, decimalization may
cause the price impact to decline since prices can ad-
just by smaller increments, but it may also cause the
price impact to rise since more prices must be exhaust-
ed because depth at any given price is lower.
In the price impact framework, the dependent vari-
able of interest is the trade-to-trade return on a given
stock. I denote this return rt and define it formally as
the change in the natural logarithm of the midquote of
a given stock that follows the trade at time t.4 That is,
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The use of midquotes eliminates price changes
caused by the bid–ask bounce, that is, the alternating
arrival of buys and sells transacting at the ask and bid
price, respectively. Following Hasbrouck (1991), I de-
fine the variable xt as an indicator of the direction of
the trade occurring at time t. If the trade is initiated by
the buyer, the variable xt = 1. If the trade is initiated
by the seller, then the variable xt = –1. I assume trades
at a transaction price greater than the midquote were
buyer-initiated and trades below the midquote were
seller-initiated. For trades at the midquote, xt is as-
signed to equal zero. Defining Dt as an indicator that
equals 1 if trade t occurs during the first 30 minutes
of the trading day and dect as an indicator that equals
1 if trade t occurs during the decimal period after
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for each stock in my sample.6 The price impact of a
trade in this framework is equal to the sum of the γi
coefficients during the pre-decimalization period and
equal to the sum of the γi + λi coefficients after deci-
malization. Because purchases should put upward pres-
sure on prices, I expect that γi should be positive for
some or all of the trade lags i. This prediction follows
from traditional microstructure theory. In Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), for example, market makers set a
positive bid–ask spread as compensation for trades
made with counterparties with superior information.
As a sequence of sell orders arrives, market makers
lower bid prices, incorporating the probability that
the order flow implies that better-informed investors
believe the previous price was too high. The reverse
occurs when a sequence of buy orders arrives. This
type of dynamic quote adjustment leads to the pre-
diction of a positive value of the γi coefficients. The
λi coefficients may be either positive or negative de-
pending on whether the stock has become less or
more liquid (higher or lower price impact of a trade)
since decimalization.
Table 2 summarizes the results from these 1,339
regressions. Each row of table 2 corresponds to stocks
in different trade activity categories. The numbers re-
ported in the first column represent the average value
of the sum of the γi coefficients across all stocks in
the given category. These coefficients measure the price
impact of a trade in the two weeks prior to decimal-
ization. For instance, the first entry in the first column
reports that the average price impact of a trade during
this time is 9.2 basis points for stocks in the least ac-
tively traded category. Put another way, 11 trades in
the same direction move an infrequently traded stock’s
price by 1 percent. As the numbers in the first col-
umn indicate, liquidity as measured by price impact
increases with trading activity, since trades of more
actively traded stocks move prices less. For example,
a trade of a stock of a very actively traded security moves
the stock’s price by just over 1 basis point. The num-
bers in the second and third columns summarize the
statistical significance of the price impact results. The
second and third columns report the fraction of stocks
in the given category whose price impact estimate was
positive and statistically significant (at the 5 percent
level) and negative and statistically significant, respec-
tively. As the numbers in columns two and three indi-
cate, none of the stocks in the sample had a negative
and significant price impact of a trade, whereas virtu-
ally all of the sample stocks had significantly positive
price impacts.
The last three columns summarize the results for
the decimalization period. A comparison of the fourth
column with the first indicates that for stocks in all
categories, the average price impact of a trade declined
following decimalization. That is, stocks became more
liquid on average. However, the numbers reported in
the final two columns suggest that this result is not as
uniform as the positive price impact result reported
for the pre-decimalization period. For stocks in the
least actively traded category, only one-quarter saw
a statistically significant decrease in price impact
following decimalization. Around two-thirds of the
stocks in category two had statistically significant
increases in liquidity. For the more actively traded
stocks, that is, those that on average trade at least
once per minute, more than 95 percent witnessed
an increase in liquidity (decrease in price impact)
following decimalization. The magnitude of the in-
creased liquidity is fairly large, with the typical de-
cline in price impact following decimalization being
close to 40 percent.
TABLE 2
Average price impact of a trade: Before and after decimalization
Before decimalization After decimalization
Average Share of Share of Average Share of Share of
price stocks with stocks with price stocks with stocks with
impact positive negative impact positive negative
Trade category (sum of γ γ γ γ γi) and sig. γ γ γ γ γi and sig. γ γ γ γ γi (sum of γ γ γ γ γi + λ λ λ λ λi) and sig. λ λ λ λ λi and sig. λ λ λ λ λi
1 0.092 0.974 0.000 0.074 0.016 0.251
2 0.070 0.999 0.000 0.045 0.007 0.652
3 0.043 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.008 0.945
4 0.032 1.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.954
5 0.023 1.000 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.957
6 0.011 1.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 1.000
Based on the regression equation  [] [] −− −−
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The preceding results suggest that decimalization
led to increased liquidity for virtually all stocks that
trade at least once per minute. Among less frequently
traded stocks, the results were more mixed, with a sig-
nificant fraction of stocks experiencing no statistically
significant change in price impact following the move
to decimal pricing. My previous discussion of micro-
structure theory, however, suggests that decreases in
tick size and depth may have different implications
for trades of different sizes. In particular, small trades
may benefit from tighter spreads and correspondingly
smaller price increments because they can normally be
executed within posted depth. Large trades, however,
may have become less liquid following decimalization
due to the significant decline in depth. I extend my
empirical framework to test for this possibility. I de-
fine the variable Bigt as an indicator that equals 1 when
trade t is among the largest 10 percent of trades for
the given stock and then estimate an extended regres-
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In equation 3, I have extended the previous regres-
sion equation by allowing the price impact of a trade,
both before and after decimalization, to differ depend-
ing on whether the trade is large. Since large trades have
been generally found to be less liquid (see Hasbrouck,
1991), one might expect the µi coefficients to be posi-
tive. That is, larger trades will move prices more than
smaller trades. The φi coefficients allow a direct test of
the hypothesis that the liquidity of large trades has been
adversely affected by the move to decimal pricing.
Table 3 summarizes the results from estimating
equation 3 for all 1,339 stocks in the sample. Table 3
follows a similar format as table 2, only expanded to
account for the fact that I now distinguish between
large trades (those in the top 10 percent of size with-
in the given stock) and regular trades (all others). The
first three columns of panel A in table 3 report statis-
tics for regular trades prior to decimalization. These
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in
the first three columns in table 2. In particular, I find
positive and statistically significant price impacts for
virtually all stocks in the sample for regular sized trades.
The size of the price impact is lower than that report-
ed for all trades in table 2. This can be explained by
the larger impacts found for large trades reported in
columns four to six of table 3. For example, a regular
trade of a stock in category 6 (most actively traded)
moved the stock’s price by roughly 0.9 basis points.
Large trades of such a stock moved the price by 3.0
basis points. Since I define large trades to be the top
10 percent of the size distribution, one might expect
the average price impact of an actively traded stock
to be 90% × 0.9 + 10% × 3.0 = 1.11 basis points, which
is the result reported in table 2.
The results in columns four to six of table 3 also
indicate that large trades are not necessarily less liquid
for relatively infrequently traded stocks. In particular,
I find that larger trades have a larger price impact for
only 29 percent of stocks trading every five to ten min-
utes and for only 50 percent of stocks trading every
one to five minutes. Large trades of stocks trading at
least every 30 seconds, however, do typically move
prices more than other trades. For these more active-
ly traded stocks, large trades move prices between
two and three times more than regular trades.
Panel B in table 3 summarizes the regression re-
sults related to the period following decimalization.
Average price impacts of regular trades fell following
decimalization for virtually all stocks trading at least
once each minute. For example, the price impact of a
regular trade of a very actively traded stock (category 6)
fell from 0.9 basis points to 0.5 basis points after deci-
malization. For stocks trading every 30–60 seconds
(category 3), the average price impact of regular trades
fell from 3.9 basis points to 2.3 basis points. For stocks
trading only every five to ten minutes, decimalization
did not generally lead to lower price impacts of regu-
lar trades. I find a statistically significant decline in
price impact (increase in liquidity) for only 17.8 per-
cent of such stocks.
The final three columns of panel B report my find-
ings regarding the liquidity of large trades after decimal-
ization relative to before. On average, large trades are
more liquid in the post-decimalization period. For
example, a large trade of a stock in the most actively
traded category moved the stock’s price by an average
of 3.0 basis points before decimalization, but by only
1.9 basis points after decimalization. For all 11 of these
stocks, the decline in price impact (increase in liquid-
ity) of large trades was statistically significant. Across
stocks in the entire sample, the decline in price im-
pact for large trades was less common than that found
for regular trades. For example, I find that the price
impact of a regular trade declined post-decimalization
for 92.0 percent of stocks that were traded every 30–
60 seconds (Category 3). However, the price impact
of a large trade fell in only 37.1 percent of these stocks9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
following decimalization. Most stocks trading less
frequently did not witness an increase in liquidity for
large trades following decimalization. For example,
among stocks trading only every five to ten minutes,
only 8.4 percent of the stocks saw a decline in price
impact for large trades following decimalization. In
fact, 2.6 percent of such stocks actually saw an increase
in price impact. Higher price impacts following deci-
malization, however, were virtually nonexistent for
stocks trading at least once every five minutes.
As a robustness check, I reestimate equation 3
after changing the definition of a large trade. The pre-
vious definition of large was an absolute one, namely
any trade that was among the largest 10 percent of all
trades of a given stock during the sample period. To
consider more explicitly that the liquidity of a trade
is not only related to size, but also to depth, I repeat
the analysis defining the variable Big to be equal to
1 when the given trade is executed for more shares
than posted depth. That is, a buy transaction for more
shares than posted ask depth or a sell transaction for
more shares than posted bid depth would be defined
as a large trade. Whereas 10 percent of trades were
previously defined as large, this alternative definition
TABLE 3
Average price impact of a trade: Before and after decimalization, by trade size
identifies roughly 19 percent of all trades. However,
only approximately 60 percent of trades previously
identified as large satisfy this new definition. This
implies that much of the time, large trades occur
when depth is also high.
Table 4 reports results analogous to those in
table 3 for this alternative definition of a large trade.
The most substantial difference from the earlier results
is that trades that satisfy the new definition of big
seem more highly correlated with lower levels of liquidi-
ty. Whereas less than half of stocks trading less than
once per minute (Categories 1 and 2) had higher price
impacts for trades in the top 10 percent of the size
distribution (table 3), well over half of these stocks
experience a greater price impact for trades greater
than posted depth (table 4). The magnitude of the price
impact for these large trades is now larger under this
definition. Whereas the largest 10 percent of trades
of the most frequently traded stocks moved price by
3.0 basis points, trades greater than posted depth moved
the price of these same stocks by 3.9 basis points be-
fore decimalization.
With this new definition of large trades, decimal-
ization is still generally correlated with increased
A. Before decimalization
Regular trades Trades with size in top decile
Share of Share of Share of Share of
Average stocks with stocks with Average stocks with stocks with
price impact positive and negative and price impact positive negative
Trade category (sum of  γ  γ  γ  γ  γi) sig. γ γ γ γ γi sig. γ γ γ γ γi (sum of γ γ γ γ γi + µ  µ  µ  µ  µi)  and sig. µ µ µ µ µi and sig. µ µ µ µ µi
1 0.080 0.942 0.005 0.141 0.288 0.000
2 0.062 0.989 0.000 0.115 0.499 0.001
3 0.039 1.000 0.000 0.077 0.789 0.000
4 0.029 1.000 0.000 0.062 0.944 0.000
5 0.019 1.000 0.000 0.049 1.000 0.000
6 0.009 1.000 0.000 0.030 1.000 0.000
B. After decimalization
Regular trades Trades with size in top decile
Share of Share of Average Share of Share of
Average stocks with stocks with price impact stocks with stocks with
price impact positive and negative and (sum of positive negative
Trade category (sum of γ γ γ γ γi + λ λ λ λ λi) sig. λ λ λ λ λi sig. λ λ λ λ λi γ γ γ γ γi + λ λ λ λ λi + µ µ µ µ µi + θ θ θ θ θi) and sig. θ θ θ θ θi and sig. θ θ θ θ θi
1 0.067 0.016 0.178 0.126 0.026 0.084
2 0.042 0.008 0.569 0.101 0.008 0.140
3 0.023 0.008 0.920 0.061 0.004 0.371
4 0.018 0.000 0.926 0.044 0.000 0.657
5 0.013 0.014 0.914 0.033 0.000 0.886
6 0.005 0.000 1.000 0.019 0.000 1.000
Based on the regression equation  [] [ ]
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TABLE 4
Average price impact of a trade: Before and after decimalization, by trade size
(alternative definition of a large trade)
A. Before decimalization
Regular trades Trades with size > posted depth
Share of Share of Share of Share of
Average stocks with stocks with Average stocks with stocks with
price impact positive and negative and price impact positive negative
Trade category (sum of  γ  γ  γ  γ  γi) sig. γ γ γ γ γi sig. γ γ γ γ γi (sum of γ γ γ γ γi + µ  µ  µ  µ  µi)  and sig. µ µ µ µ µi and sig. µ µ µ µ µi
1 0.074 0.942 0.000 0.188 0.476 0.000
2 0.058 0.988 0.000 0.143 0.731 0.003
3 0.035 1.000 0.000 0.091 0.987 0.000
4 0.026 1.000 0.000 0.070 1.000 0.000
5 0.017 1.000 0.000 0.057 1.000 0.000
6 0.008 1.000 0.000 0.039 1.000 0.000
B. After decimalization
Regular trades Trades with size > posted depth
Share of Share of Average Share of Share of
Average stocks with stocks with price impact stocks with stocks with
price impact positive and negative and (sum of positive negative
Trade category (sum of γ γ γ γ γi + λ λ λ λ λi) sig. λ λ λ λ λi sig. λ λ λ λ λi γ γ γ γ γi + λ λ λ λ λi + µ µ µ µ µi + θ θ θ θ θi) and sig. θ θ θ θ θi and sig. θ θ θ θ θi
1 0.062 0.010 0.168 0.140 0.010 0.173
2 0.040 0.011 0.553 0.106 0.010 0.325
3 0.020 0.008 0.895 0.062 0.000 0.679
4 0.015 0.000 0.926 0.044 0.000 0.935
5 0.010 0.014 0.957 0.033 0.000 0.957
6 0.004 0.000 1.000 0.019 0.000 1.000
Based on the regression equation  [] [ ] −− − − − −−
==
=α + β +δ + γ +λ +µ +θ +ε ∑∑
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Note: Sig. indicates significant.
liquidity (lower price impact) of actively traded stocks.
Further, more stocks have a statistically significant
decline in price impact for large trades under the new
definition. With large trades defined as those with size
greater than posted depth, virtually all stocks trading
at least every 30 seconds and two-thirds of those trad-
ing every 30–60 seconds witnessed an increase in li-
quidity of large trades following decimalization. Thus,
according to these two measures of large trade size,
decimalization seems to have led to increased liquid-
ity for most actively traded stocks, and in virtually
no cases did decimalization lead to less liquidity,
even for large trades.
Conclusion
This article has examined the impact of decimal-
ization on the liquidity of NYSE stocks. Analyzing
transaction data for a sample of 1,339 stocks listed
on the NYSE over a five-week period surrounding
the January 29, 2001, implementation of decimaliza-
tion, I presented evidence of the following: Minimum
price increments do seem to have an impact on bid–ask
spreads. In particular, for nearly all but the least-trad-
ed stocks, bid–ask spreads were equal to the mini-
mum price increment at least once each day during the
sample period. Decimalization also led to a narrowing
of average bid–ask spreads. The largest declines in
spreads were found for the most actively traded stocks,
where the average decline in spreads was over 35 per-
cent. I also documented that the observed compression
of bid–ask spreads was accompanied by a decline in
posted depth. The decline in depth was also most
pronounced for the most actively traded stocks.
Because these findings suggest that decimaliza-
tion had an ambiguous impact on market liquidity
using spreads and depth as proxies for liquidity, I then
estimated a different measure of liquidity that would
be affected by changes in both spreads and depth.
Specifically, I estimate the price impact of a trade for
each stock in my sample. The price impact measures
the percentage change in a stock’s price that follows
a trade. Larger price impacts, therefore, reflect lower
liquidity. Intuitively, one would expect lower price
increments to imply lower price impacts but lower depth11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
to imply higher price impacts. Thus, calculating price
impacts before and after decimalization is one measure
of stock market liquidity that encompasses changes
in both spreads and depth.
Estimating price impact regressions, I find that
actively traded stocks generally experienced an increase
in liquidity (decrease in price impact) following deci-
malization. For less frequently traded stocks, the re-
sults were mixed. In particular, most stocks in the sample
traded once every one to five minutes, and of these,
only two in three experienced a statistically significant
decline in average price impact following decimalization.
I then expanded my empirical framework to con-
sider explicitly the fact that declines in posted depth
may be more important for large trades, defined as those
among the largest 10 percent of trades for a given stock.
These large trades may be more likely to be executed
at prices other than the best bid and ask price. I con-
firm that price impacts of these larger trades are greater,
reflecting their lower liquidity. Even though these large
trades have higher price impacts than other trades, I still
find that decimalization generally improved the liquid-
ity of large trades for actively traded stocks. However,
I find no statistically significant improvement in liquidi-
ty of large trades for a wider set of stocks in my sample.
For my set of stocks trading every one to five minutes,
for example, only one in seven experienced a statisti-
cally significant increase in liquidity of large trades
following decimalization. The liquidity of large trades
of most stocks after decimalization was statistically
indistinguishable from their liquidity before. My find-
ings were similar when I defined large trades as those
whose size was greater than posted depth.
The findings in this study suggest that decimal-
ization on the NYSE was a positive step because
policymakers prefer more liquid markets. Virtually
all actively traded stocks had improved levels of liquid-
ity following decimalization using price impact as
the liquidity measure, even if this improved liquidity
was not realized by those making large trades. Thus,
with respect to market liquidity, the lower willing-
ness of market participants to post limit orders seems
to be more than offset by the availability of a wider
array of prices at which to trade.
In the two years since decimalization, spreads and
depth have continued to fall. Actively traded stocks
typically have average spreads of around 3 cents, where-
as relatively infrequently traded stocks have spreads
of around 6 cents. Thus, market developments suggest
that it may not be long before one may ask whether
minimum price increments of 1 cent should be aban-
doned. Even before decimalization, prices were not
always equal to multiples of a penny, and thus, in prin-
ciple, prices could be as finely divided as desired by
traders. Perhaps, therefore, the optimal tick size is
less than a penny.
NOTES
1A few months later, the National Association of Securities Dealers
did the same for stocks trading on Nasdaq.
2Trades can affect prices for reasons of asymmetric information.
This will be discussed later in the article.
3Monday, January 15, 2001, was a holiday.
4I eliminate observations spanning more than one business day.
5For the regressions, I do not include the middle week of my
sample (that is, the week of January 29, 2001) to control for the
possibility that market participants require a period of adjustment
to a new quoting system.
6I choose five lags following Hasbrouck (1991). The results are
robust to adjustments in lag length.12 4Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
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